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I. INTRODUCTION
"There are able-bodied men here who work from early morning
until late at night, in ice-cold cellars with a quarter of an inch of
water on the floor-men who for six or seven months in the year
J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 2010; Franklin & Marshall College, Bachelor of Arts,
2005; Research and Writing Editor for the UNIVERSIY OF MWv BusINEss LAW REvIEW. For insightful
comments, I thank David Abraham. I would also like to thank my family and specifically my brothers Cole
and Kyler for the fruitful discussions and challenges that gave rise to my desire to take on this article's subject
matter.
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never see the sunlight from Sunday afternoon till the next Sunday
morning-and who cannot earn three hundred dollars in a year."'
In 1906, Upton Sinclair described the conditions of the Chicago
meatpacking industry and the struggle of an immigrant worker in an
industrial workforce. In 2008, immigration authorities raided the nation's
largest kosher slaughterhouse uncovering hundreds of undocumented
employees, and revealing Agriprocessors, Inc. as a prime example of the
egregious employer exploitation that will occur amidst a broken
immigration system.2 This raises questions; what will it take to bring
justice to the workplace and how much longer will it take for positive
change in employment practices to take root?
Current immigration laws often obstruct enforcement of labor and
employment laws. National immigration policies, codified specifically in
the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"),' the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"),4 and
the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., v.
NLRB,s undermine the legislative force needed to uphold and implement
fair and nondiscriminatory practices in the workplace for all employees
irrespective of immigration status.6 Where laws inadequately protect
immigrant workers, employers repeatedly take liberties to maximize
profits at the expense of all workers. When employment laws are invoked,
it is typically with little or no reprimand to the employer despite the fact
that the companies' hiring practices created an environment in which
serious violations occurred. The publicity given to Postville, Iowa and the
raids of the Agriprocessors meatpacking plant raised awareness of these
issues nationwide. Stemming from the raid, federal court cases against
Agriprocessors and its operators reinforce the position that the current law
has little deterrent effect on employers.
For a transformation to take place, the United States ("U.S.") must
alter its view of global standards and enforcement, and businesses need to
I UTON SINClAIR, THEJUNGLE 15 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2003) (1906).
2 UFCW, RAIDS ON WORKERS: DESTROYING OUR RIGHTS 38 (2009), available at
http/v/www.ufcw.orgfdocUploadUFCW%/2OICE%2rpt%2OFINAL%20150B%5FO61809%/ 5Fl30632/2Ep
dPCFID= 10217037&CFTOKEN= 65919529.
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
Mega Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-208, SS
401-421, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a).
s 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (precluding the NLRB from awarding backpay to undocumented workers).
6 See Leticia M. Saucedo, A New "U": Organizing Victims and Proating Immigrant Worken, 42 U.
RiCH. L REv. 891,894 (2008).
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take the lead as part of a broader corporate responsibility to uphold the
law. But other than doing the "right" thing, what mechanisms are in
place to change the way we look at the intersection of labor laws,
immigration laws, and good business practice? The law must be
enforceable, it must be manageable, and it must be reasonable; it cannot
overly burden business in such a way that employers focus on methods of
successfully circumventing the law. In a society in which the immigrant
population is so tightly woven into the workforce, these laws need to
make the employer equally responsible to all workers regardless of legal
status.
The deliberate nature with which many labor violations are present in
the workplace calls for rethinking the law and requires doing so with
particular attention to migrant workers. In meatpacking plants, other
industrial work, and even more critically in service industries where
workers do not regularly congregate, the breakdown in union
representation means the bargaining power of workers is at an all time
low. Where the workers are immigrants, employers are typically less
concerned that their violations will be recognized or reported by workers
who are more concerned with staying in the U.S. and maintaining
whichever job they have acquired. If these workers know they can
enforce their right to work for minimum wage in a safe and clean
environment, they often forego taking a stand in hopes of remaining
undetected by immigration authorities.
This comment will analyze the particular failures that arise where
labor and immigration intersect while considering the general forces that
curb or drive corporate behavior; it will provide two ways in which the
law might better deter violative behavior and transform the global
interpretation of labor rights.
This comment will begin by examining the current intersection
between immigration and labor laws using key case examples, like
Hoffman Plastic,' to illustrate the ways in which the law has failed to move
in the same direction as economic activity with respect to workplace
demands, failed to provide protection to workers, and failed to offer
guidance to employers. The first part will look at key statutes where
immigration and labor intersect and consider their influence on the
current climate for migrant workers by pointing to the specific provisions
that inadequately afford protection or inadequately make enforcement a
priority. This part will also address the Hoffman decision directly and the
court precedents on which it relies in order to propose a change in the
535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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current rationale, which so often leads to policies that undermine equal
treatment for migrant workers. The second part will cover the evolution
of the meatpacking industry and union presence in the U.S. by exploring
the factors that have contributed to the role unionization plays (and does
not play) in today's workforce. It will also address theories about how
immigration factors complicate the traditional union model for organizing
workers in order to provide the context under which exploitation of
workers becomes as pervasive as it does in particular industries, like
meatpacking.
Third, this comment will closely look to the 2008 raids in Iowa that
led to the filing of multiple criminal cases against employees, managers,
and the company itself, Agriprocessors, Inc. This part will focus on the
parties' assertions and motions and consider the relevance of particular
discourse used to serve the parties. This part will also address the legal
claims raised about the Agriprocessors plant in an effort to illustrate the
egregious nature of the company's continued flagrant disregard for the
law. This case study will provide one of the leading examples of why
reform is needed in U.S.' immigration and labor policies.
Finally, the article will discuss two key ways in which a shift in the
model used to understand the relationship between the worker and the
employer must be reshaped. First, a pre-Hoffiman concept of "employee"
status under the law ought to be revived to disincentivize illegal
recruitment of migrant workers by employers and to forestall flagrant
violators like Agriprocessors. Second, there ought to be internationally
harmonized rules enforceable in the U.S. that capture this arena by
incorporating the obligations the U.S. has already made to the
international community in the arena of human rights. These changes
should be adopted in light of the reality that businesses cannot and must
not be entrusted with making a choice between profit margins and the
greater good.
II. THE LABOR MOVEMENT AND IMMIGRATION LAWS
The link between labor and immigration is increasingly brought to
our attention though it has always been a part of the American life. Since
this intersection is overwhelmingly unsupported by existing laws,
practices, and policies that lack enforcement mechanisms, each set of laws
is undermined by the other. The inadequacies in IRCA, IIRIRA, and the
Supreme Court's decision in Hoffinan, are significant standing alone.
However, the legal shortcomings are even more drastic when considered
in the context of Agriprocessors' continued employment of
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undocumented workers, the company's obvious attempts to circumvent
union representation in their plants, and Agriprocessors and its
operational manager, Sholom Rubashkin's attempts to avoid liability
under IRCA.
A. The Immigration Reform and Control Act
Prior to 1986, immigration law did not often discuss employment
explicitly. Initially, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")
criminalized "knowing or reckless" attempts to "encourage[ ] or induce[]
an alien to come to, enter, or reside" in the U.S.8 In the same vein, it
established a criminal penalty for anyone who "conceals, harbors, or
shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from
detection, such alien in any place, including any building or any means of
transportation,"' but there was no prohibition against employing
undocumented immigrant workers.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), enacted in
1986, was the first modern attempt at combining the two areas of law." It
was not very useful in reconciling the market competition for low-wage
employment or the attractiveness of an American job because it focused
entirely on the need to change behavior and motivations." IRCA made it
unlawful to "hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the
United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien."' 2 This
"knowingly" standard established that for an employer to be charged with
violating the law, the government would have the burden of proving that
the employer had knowledge that the worker was undocumented and that
he or she employed the worker anyway.' This provision quickly became
ineffective because employer scienter was nearly impossible to prove."
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C S 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iv) (1952).
9 Id. 5 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).
1o IRCA was not the first employment-related immigration law in the U.S. The Contract Labor Act
of 1885 prohibited importing immigrants by means of a labor contract. It remained in effect until the INA
was passed in 1952. See The Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164,23 Stat. 332 (repealed 1952) (prohibiting any
person or company "to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the importation or
migration of... any foreigner ... to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States . . . .").
I See NLRB v. AP.RA. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) (arguing that
"IRCA ... demonstrates Congress's intent to focus on employers, not employees, in deterring unlawful
employment relationships....").
12 8 U.S.C. S 1324a(a)(1)(A) (1996).
13 See id. S 1324(a)(1)-(2).
14 See, e.g., Collins Foods Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. LN.S., 948 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
because Congress did not intend the statute to cause employers to become experts in identifying and
2872010]1
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IRCA also implemented the requirement that employers examine
documentation of all new employees.'" A new employee is required
under IRCA to establish his or her authorization to work and identity by
showing proof of identity evidencing employment authorization. 6  The
statutory standard for employers to confirm the validity of these
documents rests in the document "reasonably appear[ing] on its face to be
genuine."" At first glance, this requirement of employer documentation
verification appears to put the burden on the employer to verify the
worker's status and provide support to the "knowingly" standard by
ensuring that there is a record of the employer having confirmed the
worker's documents before employing the individual. In effect, however,
requiring only that the documents "reasonably appear[ ] genuine",1 gives
an employer tremendous leeway in escaping charges where the
employees' documents are false. So long as the employer acts in good
faith, without knowledge of employees' status and in formal compliance
with the requirements, the employer cannot be regarded as knowingly
employing the undocumented worker." Thereby an employer establishes
an affirmative defense if charges are brought.20 As a practical matter, the
assumption that an employer in any of the traditionally immigrant-
dominated workplaces, such as a meatpacking plant, will be the best judge
of valid documentation imposes a highly un-standardized process.
Furthermore, the misplaced duty suggests that the drafters intended to
impose a rather low burden on the employers after all.
If an employer knowingly hires an unauthorized immigrant in
contravention of the statute, an administrative judge is statutorily required
to issue a cease and desist order. This can carry civil fines ranging from
$250 to $2,000 per unauthorized immigrant for the first violation and
exponentially increasing amounts for each subsequent violation.2'
examining a prospective employee's employment authorization documents, the employer complied with
verification requirements. Thus, offering an alien a job prior to verification of these documents does not
support a finding of constructive knowledge).
15 See 8 U.S.C. S 1324a(b).
16 The statute establishes that a driver's license, passport or Social Security card are all acceptable
documents for this purpose. See id. 5 1324a(b)(1)(B).
17 Id. S 1324a(b)(1)(A)(ii).
1s Id.
1 See id. S 1324a(a)(3).
20 See id.
21 See id. § 1324a(e)(4).
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Employers are also statutorily barred from discriminating against job
applicants or employees based on national origin or citizenship status.
Specifically, this provision prohibits an employer from asking an
employee to produce "more or different documents than are required"2
or from refusing to honor documents that reasonably appear to be
genuine. 24  This provision does not appear to have had the intended
effect,25 and if enforced, would put employers in a precarious position in
being required to accept documents that "reasonably appear genuine" even
though they might not actually know the difference. The employer's only
other option is to face discrimination charges for trying to impose their
own screening mechanisms.
The Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE")26 is in charge of enforcing IRCA;27 still, the
undocumented worker problem persists.2 8 Because of the awkwardly
imposed documentary standard that charges the employer with reviewing
the workers' documents, and because some of these documents are easily
counterfeited, immigrants without legal status have been hired for jobs,
2 See 8 U.S.C. S 1324b(a) (1996).
2 Id. S 1324b(a)(6).
24 Id.
2 Since IRCA was enacted through 1990, it was "estimated [that] 227,000 employers (five percent of
those surveyed) had begun not to hire individuals because of foreign appearances or accents." Nicolas J.
Watkins & Joel Stewart, Emplo},r Sanctdns Update and the Employer's Response, 66 FiA. B.J. 60, 60 (May 1992)
(referring to U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE
QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 71 (1990)).
6 When IRCA was originally adopted as legislation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") investigated and enforced workplace violations involving the employment of undocumented
workers. See 8 C.F.R S 274a.9 (2003). On March 1, 2003, the INS was removed from the Department of
Justice to the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). See Authority of the Secretary of Homeland
Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 10922 (proposed Mar. 6,2003) (codified at 8 C.F.R S 2.1). Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") is now the sub-agency under the Department of Homeland Security that investigates
IRCA violations. Id.
2 See Homeland Security Act of 2002 S5 441, 451, 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2136-37.
a The Department of Homeland Security estimates that the number of undocumented workers in
the United States reached 11.6 million in January 2008. See MICHAEL HOEFER Er AL, OFFICE OF IMMIG.
STAT., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED
STATES: JANUARY 2008 2 (2009), available at http:/w.dhs.govfxibrary/assets/statistic/publications/
ois illpe2008.pdf There are estimates that 4 to 6 million of these undocumented individuals are working in
fields, actories, and on construction sites. See Rebecca Smith et al., Low Pay, High Risk: State Models for
Advancing Immigrant Worers' Right, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 597,598-99 (2004) (citing B. LINDSAY
LOWELL & ROBERT SURO, How MANY UNDOCUMENTED: THE NUMBERS BEHIND THE U.S.-MEXICO
MIGRATION TALKS 7-8 (2002), available at httpV/pewhispanic.org/reports/ reportphp?ReportlD=6).
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such as those in the meatpacking industry.29 Armed with the knowledge
of their typical workers' immigration status and of those workers' fears
connected with reporting any problems in the workplace, the meatpacking
industry and other immigrant-dominated industries have easily taken
advantage of this influx of apprehensive, vulnerable, yet hard working
individuals.3 0 The mens rea requirements of IRCA laid the groundwork
for creating scenarios like the raid of the Agriprocessors' meatpacking
plant in Iowa. Workplace and labor loopholes slowly became the means
by which the government could categorically enforce immigration
standards.
B. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
1. Basic Provisions
In 1996, Congress amended IRCA with the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"). 1 While it seems
that IIRIRA clarifies some of the concerns raised under IRCA, IIRIRA
still leaves something to be desired where undocumented workers
continue to gain employment and employers avoid fidelity to both
immigration and labor laws. First, IIRIRA's pilot programs,32 such as E-
Verify," are voluntary.34  Second, IIRIRA requires that employers take
2 See Smith et al., supra note 28, at 598-99 (the dynamic described by Smith of 'low pay-high risk' is
two fold; low-wage worker industries, like meatpacking highlight this precisely because the pay is hourly, a
high degree of skill is not required of the workers, and in turn employers tend to be less scrutinizing of
employment documents in their hiring practices. Employers have been willing to take the risk of safety,
immigration, and wage-payment violations because they can count on a lack of enforcement by federal and
state agencies as to the employer's in-house practices. Generally, employers can rely on migrant employees
not to report their employers because they want to avoid having their immigration documents scrutinized any
more heavily.); JEFFREY L. RODENGEN & JON VANZILE, THE LEGEND OF IBP: ESTABUSHED 1960 181
(2000) ("The meat industry had always been a point of entry for immigrants joining American society.").
3 See generally Rebecca Smith & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Solutions, Not Scapegoats: Abating Sweatshop
Conditions forAll Low-Wage Worker as a Centerpiece ofinum gration Rfonn, 10 N.Y.U.J. LEGIs. & PUB. POL'Y 555
(2007); see also Jenny Schulz, Note, Grappling with a Meaty 1ssue: IlkRRA's Efte on Immigrants in the Meatpacking
Industry, 2J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 137,145-46 (1998).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1996).
32 IIRIRA establishes three types of "pilot programs": a basic pilot program, a citizen attestation pilot
program, and a machine-readable-document pilot program. See IUIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, S 401(c)(1)-
(3), 110 Stat. 3009-655 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. S 1324a).
33 The E-Verify program is one of the pilot programs established by IRIRA and is an internet-based
system operated by DHS in partnership with the Social Security Administration ("SSA") that allows
participating employers to electronically verify the employment eligibility of newly hired employees. E-Verify
electronically compares information provided by the Form 1-9 with records contained in the SSA and DHS
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additional steps in their hiring processes." Where IRCA required that an
employer review every new employee's identification and employment
authorization documents," IIRIRA requires that the employer contact
immigration authorities for confirmation of work authorization within
three days of hiring a new employee." If the immigration authority does
not confirm the employee's authorization to work in the United States
within three business days, the employer is required to inform the
employee of the non-confirmation." At that time, the employee may
choose to contest the non-confirmation. If the employee chooses not to
contest it,3 9 the employer is statutorily permitted to terminate the
employment of the worker,40 and in fact, is required to terminate the
employment in order to avoid his or her own sanctions under the law.41 If
the employee contests the non-confirmation, immigration authorities will
attempt to verify the employee's status a second time and will provide a
final determination within ten working days.42 If the INS issues the
second non-confirmation, the employer must terminate the employee's
working status. 43
2. Concerns with IIRIRA's Application
Because the system imposed by IIRIRA is mostly voluntary" and is
not one that is applied nationwide,4 s IIRIRA leaves open the possibility
that undocumented workers circumvent the system by seeking
employment with those employers who are not a part of one of the pilot
programs. Even if the employers who voluntarily adopt it are actively
applying the system, it is not effective as a comprehensive effort to
encourage employers or immigrant workers to demand higher standards
or enforcement of the law.
databases. E-Verify is currently free to employers. Se USCIS, E-VeriV, httpV/www.dhs.gov/e-vefify (last
visited Feb. 11, 2010).
I IRIRA 5 402(a).
3s See id. 5 403(a).
36 See 8 U.S.C. S 1324a(b) (1996).
3 11R1RA S 403(a)(3)(A).
38 Id. S 403(a)(4)(B)(i).
3 See id. S 403(a)(4)(B)(iii).
4 Id. S 403(a)(4)(C)(i).
41 See id S 403(a)(4)(C)(iii).
42 Id. S 4"c).
43 See IRIRA S 403(a)(4)(C)(iii).
4 See id. 402(a).
4 See id. 5 4o1(c).
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Where employers are required to contact immigration authorities to
search the government's immigration database for a worker's document
verification, IIRIRA tends to resolve the practical problem that arose
under IRCA, which required employers to assess the worker's
documentation. 46  This is not a complete fix however as IIRIRA's
complications resemble a sort of "witch trial" for the migrant worker.47
An employer who subscribes to the E-verify system is supposed to verify
all employees regardless of his or her citizenship, but in practice the
system is not consistently used for every employee.4 8  IIRIRA allows
undocumented workers to gain employment in the U.S. by claiming U.S.
citizenship - if an undocumented worker presents actual citizenship
documents that belong to someone else the worker's status could remain
otherwise unchallenged.4 9 When a new hire attests to being a U.S. citizen,
there is no additional check under IIRIRA to verify that those documents
actually belong to that worker.so The employer simply retains the 1-9
Form." Moreover, if the worker was employed before an employer
voluntarily signed on to the program, there is also no verification
requirement for those employees.52
While IIRIRA is admittedly flawed in ways that fail to prevent
undocumented workers from gaining employment, IIRIRA also fails in its
effort to restrict employers from hiring undocumented workers. First,
IIRIRA section 402(c)(2) gives the employer a choice of whether its
participation will apply "to all its hiring" in the state(s) where the pilot
program is operating, or "to its hiring" in one or more of the plants or
4 See Schulz, supra note 30, at 152.
47 The Salem witch trials were a series of hearings before local magistrates followed by county court
oftrials to prosecute people accused ofwitchcraft. Seegenerally THE SALEM WITCHCRAFT PAPERS (Paul Boyer
& Stephen Nissenbaum, eds., 1977). The popular concept of accused witches being subject to a "sink or swim
test" where survival resulted in a presumption of guilt appears to ring true here. The analogy to the rubric
used to test the immigration status of the employee exists where the migrant worker appears to be in a lose-
lose situation ifhis or her documents are not initially verified by the immigration authorities.
4 See USCIS, E-verify - Frequently Asked Questions, httpAvww.uscis.gov/porta/site/
uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6dla?vgnextoid=42cOOO773claOl0VgnVCM1000000ecdl9
OaRCRD&vgnextchannel=75bce2e2614051 1OVgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD (last visited Sept 27,2010).
4 See IIRIRA S 403(b)(3)(B).
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See USCIS, E-verify - Frequently Asked Questions, httpV/www.uscis.gov/portaVsite/uscis/
menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66fl4l76543f6dlvgnextoid=37cfO0773clallOVgnVCM1000000ecdl9OaRC
RD&vgnextchannel=75bce2e26140511OVgnVCM100000471819OaRCRD (last visited Sept. 27, 2010) ("The
employer must initiate the query no later than the end of three business days after the new hire's actual start
date.").
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pilot program states, but it is nonetheless voluntary.53 There is little or no
incentive for the employer to "sign on" to the program. But, even if the
employer does elect to participate, the provisions appear to be so relaxed
with employers acting as the enforcers, one has to wonder whether the
law has an effect at all or whether it was intended only for demonstrative
purposes. IIRIRA also allows employers to avoid checking
documentation without being sanctioned whether the employer receives
notification from immigration services as to the employee's status or not.4
Finally, because the verification pilot program applies only to an
employer's hiring practices,55 there is no retroactive application of the law
for workers who have already obtained employment. There also seems to
be no attempt to ensure that workers remain in status.
As a policy matter, because an employer cannot ask a work applicant
about his or her citizenship status until after he or she is hired, employers
are likely to preempt the issue and potentially commit illegal acts of
discrimination in the hiring process and choose not to hire someone with
limited command of the English language, a foreign sounding accent, or a
different color skin in order to prevent the added step of checking with
immigration services. This carries many of the same concerns about
deterrence as IRCA, whereby employers attempt to manage the unwieldy
system using their own screening techniques even though they may be
discriminatory. Regardless, even this "preemption" does not impede the
problem of employers hiring undocumented workers - migrant workers
remain in search of work and employers continue to hire.5 1
Overall, IIRIRA amended IRCA by relaxing the standards for
employers.5 1 It is understandable, however, that the legislature recognized
the need to take the employers out of the business of acting as an
immigration screen. Relaxing the sanctions on the employer when he or
she fails to comply is not the answer. Compliance with the law must
remain mandatory and must be enforced. IIRIRA and IRCA have major
5 IIRIRA S 402(c)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
5 See id. S 402(b)(1)-(2).
5s See id. S 402(c)(2)(A).
56 See Julia Sellers, Fanners Use Labor Programs to Hire Migrant Workers, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, May
15, 2010, available at httpV/chronicle.augusta.comfnews/metrlO2010-05-15/farmers-use-labor-programs-hire-
migrant-workers.
5 Under IIRIRA an employer "is considered to have complied with [the] requirement. . . if there
was a good faith attempt to comply with the requirement" IIRIRA 5 411(a)(6)(A). Under IRCA, "good
faith" is only considered as an affirmative defense to the employer knowingly employing an undocumented
worker where a worker provided documentation that "reasonably appears . .. to be genuine" to the employer.
8 U.S.C. 5 1324a(b)(1)(A), 1324a(3) (1996).
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flaws; however, IRCA has had little deterrent effect on undocumented
workers in U.S.' industries. For example, in the meatpacking industry,
twenty-five percent of the workers were considered undocumented when
IIRIRA took effect.58
Because of the migrant-worker dynamic and the transitory nature of
immigrant work, labor laws that address immigration policy must account
for the fact that, even if deported, workers who do not return to the
workplace (although they often do) are replaced by other migrant workers
who come and apply for those jobs.59 Thus, immigration laws are failing
to address issues both from the employer and the employee side -
employers are not prevented from supplying the work and because
undocumented workers know they can and will be hired, and migrant
workers come regardless of the substandard working conditions.
C. Fair Labor Standards Act
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") was passed in 1938 to
eliminate "substandard labor conditions throughout the nation"' by
regulating minimum wages, maximum hours of work, and child labor in
industries affecting interstate commerce. This legislation was not enacted
to specifically address immigrant employment. Nevertheless, it has long
proven effective in enforcing violations against immigrant-employees.
FLSA mandates that U.S. employers pay FLSA-covered workers61
their weekly wages at a rate no lower than the federal minimum wage for
the first forty hours of work and no lower than one-and-one-half times
the employee's regular rate for hours worked above forty.62 The term
5 See Schulz, supra note 30, at 150 (citing Richard Brack, Immigrants Being Drawn to Miduest, DES
MOINEs REG.,June 30,1996, at 1).
9 See Carlos Guerra, Among The Big Losers in Iowa: Immigration As a Wedge Issue, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS,Jan. 5,2008, at lB ("Iowa meatpackers actively recruited workers in Mexico" to have enough
workers so that they could ship pork "from. Iowa slaughterhouses to the rest of America."); Perla Trevizo,
Guest Workers Labor Here to Support Families Back Home, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Apr. 13, 2008, at
All (reporting there are tremendous networks within Mexico to support U.S. employers looking for
employees who will travel to the U.S. to work).
6 Powell v. U.S. Cartridge CaL, 339 U.S. 497,510 (1950); see aLso 29 U.S.C. S 202(b); seegenerally Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. S 202(a) (1938).
61 Generally, a FLSA "employee" includes "any individual employed by an employer," but, for
example, independent contractors, and trainees are not included. Furthermore, employees ofa company with
annual dollar volume of sales or receipts less than $500,000 are not included nor are commissioned sales
employees or famworkers. There is also a provision that covers "domestic service employment" and
employees "engaged in interstate commerce." 29 U.S.C. SS 201 et. seq.
6 Id. S§ 206-207.
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"back pay" under FLSA is different from the "back pay" referred to under
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and other antidiscrimination
laws. As referred to in Hoffman, back pay is payment of wages that the
worker would have earned but for the unlawful or discriminatory
termination.' Under FLSA, where courts and the parties refer to "back
pay" they are referring to payment of wages and overtime the worker
actually earned but was not paid for any number of reasons.'
FLSA permits deductions that would put the pay rate below
minimum standards; "furnishing such employee with board, lodging, or
other facilities, if such board, lodging, or other facilities are customarily
furnished by such employer to his employees."" Since a recruited
worker's relocation travel costs do not constitute "board" or "lodging,"
there is often a question whether these costs constitute "other facilities,"
but this gap nevertheless disfavors the migrant worker who may or may
not be responsible for his relocation, visa, and periodic return to and from
his or her home country to remain visa-eligible. According to the
regulations, improper deductions can take the form of direct deductions
or "de facto deductions."" De facto deductions refer to the failure on the
part of the employer to reimburse the employee for an employer expense,
such as supplies or uniforms.6 Other deductions listed in the regulations
as primarily for the benefit of the employer include deductions for
required uniforms and "transportation charges where such transportation
is an incident of and necessary to the employment."'
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court and many of the U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeal have not directly answered whether a U.S. employer's
failure to pay travel costs of recruited foreign workers constitutes an
improper deduction from FLSA's minimum standards. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Arriaga v. Florida Pacific
6 See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137,141-42 (2002).
6 See 29 U.S.C. S 216(b) ("Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207
of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum
wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages."); see also i 5 216(c) ("The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid
minimum wages or the unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee or employees under section
206 or section 207 of this title, and the agreement of any employee to accept such payment shall upon payment
in full constitute a waiver by such employee of any right he may have under subsection (b) of this section to
such unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation and an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages.").
65 Id. S 203(m).
6 See 29 C.F.R S 53135 (2010).
67 Id.
8 Id.5 53132.
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Farms,69 represents the one federal appeals court that has directly
confronted this question.o The Arriaga court relied heavily on the plain
language of the U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") regulations in
holding transportation and visa costs from Mexico to the U.S. for H2-A
workers were "primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer"
and could not be counted as part of the employer's wage calculations for
purposes of compliance with FLSA's minimum standards." As evidenced
by this case, FLSA's legal language can provide for a more uniform
application of the law and, essentially, level the playing field with regard to
payment of wages. There is not specific language targeting the immigrant
workforce, but because the law addresses "deductions," and these include
such things as travel costs and visas, FLSA does serve to put migrant
workers on equal footing with any other worker. FLSA, unlike IRCA and
IIRIRA, takes account of the policy implications inherent in hiring
migrant workers including the intrinsic vulnerabilities of a more mobile
population. FLSA tends to effectuate a more realistic approach to the
labor market than does the immigration legislation that is barely enforced.
D. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB
Further challenging the way in which statutory language was to be
applied to undocumented workers, in 2002 the Supreme Court decided in
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB that an undocumented worker is
not entitled to back pay for the days he or she was prevented from
working due to an illegal firing.7 2 Under this decision, the undocumented
worker is also not entitled to the statutory remedy of reinstatement in a
dispute arising under the NLRA even when he or she is fired illegally."
In Hoffman, the plaintiffJos6 Castro was terminated for engaging in union
organizing activities and originally received the requested back pay from
the NLRB, which recognized the need to protect this class of workers.74
Ultimately however, the Supreme Court concluded that the NLRB did
a 305 F3d 1228 (1lth Cir. 2002).
70 See id. at 1238.
7 Id. at 1241-44.
72 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151-52 (2002).
73 See id. at 143 (although the Court found that the employer committed serious violations of the
NLRA, the Court also determined that the Board lacked discretion to remedy those violations by awarding
reinstatement with back-pay to employees who committed serious criminal acts as well).
74 Id. at 141-42.
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not have the power to grant back pay because the worker in question was
not legally entitled to be working in the U.S.75
The decision further thwarted undocumented workers' rights to
organize and demand their rights in the workplace.7 ' Hoffman left
undocumented workers without a substantial remedy where an employer
overtly acted unlawfully during an organizing campaign. It gave
undocumented workers no recourse in employment bargaining, made
them fearful of complaining, and took away any of the disincentives for
employers to further maximally exploit the undocumented labor force. In
fact, in some respects it vitalized employers' attempts to argue that
immigrant workers have no employment rights in the U.S at all.
Generally, the failure to enforce legal standards has set the stage for a
tumultuous relationship between immigration and labor laws. For
example, by not requiring that the employer provide back pay to the
undocumented worker, the employer is able to profit from the employee
as long as the employer continues to employ that employee. The
employer suffers no significant consequences either for having employed
someone illegally or for having subjected that worker to standards that
would be impermissible if the employee were working legally. Arguably,
Hoffman is one of the most conclusive statements the Court has made
regarding the intersection of immigration and labor law. The sentiment
was clear that imposing sanctions on undocumented immigrants was
more of a priority than imposing sanctions on those who employed and
exploited them.
Ultimately, Hoffman remains a frightening baseline - one that has
created an even deeper divide among workers and a greater stigma for
immigrants in the workplace. Nevertheless, some analysts will
undoubtedly contend that undocumented workers should not be entitled
to the same remedies as documented and citizen workers. Hoffman has
75 See id. at 151-52.
76 See id. (the Court prescribes that orders for Hoffman cease and desist its violations of the NLRA
and that it conspicuously post a notice to employees detailing their rights under the NLRA are "significant
sanctions").
" "In the ten-year period from 1992 to 2002, the number of investigations of employers of illegal
aliens declined seventy percent, from 7053 to 2061, on-site job arrests of illegal aliens declined from 8027 to
451, and the fines imposed on employers declined from 1063 to thirteen-a staggenng ninety-nine percent
decrease." Hugh Alexander Fuller, Immigration, Compensation and Preemption: The Proper Measure ofLost Future
Eaming Capaity Damages After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 58 BAYLOR L REV. 985, 1003
(2006).
8 See, e.g., Jarod S. Gonzalez, Employment Law Remedies for Illegal Immigrants, 40 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
987,994-99 (2008).
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not detracted from the still strong incentive for employers to recruit and
exploit the undocumented workforce. Instead, Hoffman effectively
encourages the businesses or corporations, in light of employers' efforts to
minimize costs and maximize profit, to employ many more vulnerable
migrant workers who have no means with which to enforce their rights.
Since Hoffman, courts and the DOL have, with some success,
narrowed the decision in the context of FLSA by contending that FLSA
provides fundamental labor protections for workers and that immigration
status does not affect the remedies available to a worker contending a
FLSA violation." They have read FLSA and Title VII" to include
remedies that the judiciary, as opposed to the NLRB, had the power to
enforce."' The U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division
("WHD"), which is responsible for administering and enforcing labor
laws such as minimum wage, overtime, and child labor provisions of
FLSA, has specifically stated that it will enforce FLSA irrespective of an
employee's documentation.8 2
It is not certain that advocates will maintain this hold on FLSA in light
of Hoffman as undocumented workers have been denied back pay and front
pay for violations of the FLSA.' So far, however, there has not been a
trend to suggest that undocumented workers will be deprived of their
working wages because of their citizenship status. Such a position would
compel exploitation to reach epic proportions. The majority's rationale in
Hoffman is broad enough that one can envision this extreme application of
the holding effectively rendering undocumented workers entitled to no
remedies in the employment law context.' Whether because FLSA is not
directly tied to immigration law, or because of the policy implications
7 See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Fact Sheet #48:Application of U.S. Labor Laows to Immigrant Workers: Efect of
Hoffman Plastics Daision on Laws Enforced by dre Wage and Hour Disiion, July 2008,
httpfv/www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs48.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Labor, Fact Sheet #48].
so Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national
origin. "Tide VII" refers to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See generay 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e.
st See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp.
2d 462, 464-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (upholding protective orders preventing inquiry into plaintiffs' immigration
status in the process of discovery).
8 See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Fact Sheet #48, supra note 79.
8 See Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., No. 02 C 495, 2003 WL 21995190, at *6 (N.D. 1. Aug. 21,
2003).
84 The Hoffman majority relies on the statutory language of IRCA to suggest that an undocumented
worker is engaging in illegal behavior by "subvert[ing] the employer verification system by tendering
fraudulent documents" concluding that "it is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in
the United States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional policies." Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148 (2002) (referring to 8 U.S.C. S 1324c(a)(l)-(3)).
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such a decision to withhold wages would render viable, FLSA claims
remain available regardless of a worker's status. As an enforcement
mechanism, however, FLSA alone cannot be relied upon to require that
employers pay undocumented workers the wages to which they are
entitled. FLSA provides for recovery after wage violations have occurred,
but does not impose any real penalty on the employer. Moreover, few
undocumented workers will challenge their employers in a lawsuit for
fear of the implications it will have on their ability to remain in the U.S.
and generally FLSA violations are only brought to the attention of
authorities when employees do so." To that end, the current laws do not
adequately deter employers from hiring undocumented workers.
Despite the ideological debates, the lack of effective enforcement
mechanisms for undocumented workers in the workforce leaves many
workers, regardless of citizenship or status, working in substandard
conditions, fearful of losing their jobs, and being replaced by a new wave
of undocumented workers.
III. THE MEATPACKING INDUSTRY: HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND
TRANSFORMATION
The status of the law is just the first variable in the immigrant labor
equation. Another factor has to do with the make-up of certain workplace
environments. Particular industries, like meatpacking, have historical ties
to immigrant and migrant workforces and "ancient" barriers remain intact
to combine with devolving worker leverage. The history of meatpacking
includes a long line of conflict between employer and employee.
Through the 1860s, meatpacking was small-scale and typically served a
local market - it was not a booming industry." The work came to be
associated with mostly immigrant labor because the industrialization
process lent itself to the low-wage unskilled worker." By the end of the
19th century, however, larger plants and work complexes began to
85 See Shahid Haque, Bqnd Hoffman Plastic: Refnning Nation Labor Relations Policy to Conform to the
Immigraion Reforn and ControlAa, 79 CH.-KENT L REv. 1357,1357 (2004).
8 See LEwis COREY, MEAT AND MAN: A STUDY OF MONOPOLY, UNIONISM, AND FOOD POuCY
37(1950).
8 The immigrant worker in the meatpacking industry was a "phenomenon" that occurred two
different times in the evolution of the workforce. Both "waves" essentially illustrate the same thing - the
employer's ability to exploit the immigrant workforce, pay lower wages, and drive down costs. See Donald D.
Stull & Michael J. Broadway, Killing Them Softly: Work in Meatparing Plants and What it Does to Workers, in ANY
WAYYou CUT IT 61, 62 (Donald D. Stull et al., 1995).
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develop," the workforce grew, and packers became organized.89 Slowly,
meatpacking became a unionized industry and alongside this
development, wages increased and worker protections arose.90
From approximately the late 1930s through the 1970s, meatpacking
workers' pay and conditions improved through master contracts that
included the entire the industry.1 In the 1960s and 70s, meatpacking
workers' pay and conditions mirrored those of other industrial laborers
who worked in the plants and maintained steady jobs with promising
wages and benefits by means of the union.' "Meatpackers' wages
remained substantially higher than the average manufacturing sector
wage."' This effect did not last long. Automated facilities allowed the
unskilled worker to organize line operations in a manner that diminished
the need for skilled workers. This reopened the door to the employment
of inexperienced and low-wage employees. 94
By the 1980s, meatpacking work was not attractive to many
Americans.9 ' Companies began making more and more of the process
automatic and eliminated the need for the paid, skilled employee.96 This
became a successful way to undercut the union-negotiated standards.
Employers altered the industry and the power-structure during the 1980s
from one in which workers were organized and bargaining by means of
union, to one in which the employer recaptured the bargaining power
with every employee scraping to keep his or her job.97 As the traditional
structure of the meatpacking industry disappeared making way for line
as See COREY, supra note 86, at 48-49.
8 Id. at 61.
9 See WILUAM G. WHITAKER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS
No. RL33002, LABOR PRACTICES IN THE MEAT PACKING AND POULTRY PROCESSING INDUSTRY: AN
OVERVIEW3 (2006).
91 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR: WORKERS' RIGHTS IN U.S. MEAT AND
POULTRY PLANTS 12 (2004), available at httpVAvww.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/01/24/blood-sweat-and-fear
[hereinafter BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR] (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
INDUSTRYWAGESURVEYS, 1960-2002).
92 Id.
9 Id.
9 This was essentially the second "wave" of immigrant workers being exploited in the meatpacking
industry. See WILSON WARREN, STRUGGLING WITH "IOWA'S PRIDE": LABOR RELATIONS, UNIONISM, AND
POuTICS IN THE RURAL MIDWEST SINCE 1877 120-21 (2000).
9 See id; see abo WHITrTAKER, supra note 90, at 40.
9 See BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR, supra note 91, at 12.
9 Id. at 13.
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operators and less skilled labor the union support was destabilized and
employers began to pay lower wages.98
Some plants then relocated, some closed, and others simply fired their
long-time organized workers, and later reopened employing non-union
immigrant or migrant workers.99 This led to a dramatic change in the
labor-management relationships in meatpacking companies.'" As a
consequence, the frequency of injuries in the workplace grew
exponentially. Injury rates had been in line with other manufacturing
sectors, but with the breakdown in union representation and national
bargaining agreements meatpacking became the most dangerous factory
job in America,'o' with injury rates more than twice the national
average.1 02 Declining work conditions emerged, as the typical meatpacker
was now a non-union possibly undocumented worker, uninformed of his
rights and afraid to challenge the norms of the industry.o" The presence
of these conditions illustrated the failures in labor and immigration laws;
it called for reform and even foreshadowed the kind of breakdown in the
system that allowed Agriprocessors to continue in its illegal behaviors for
as long as it did.
While it is often stated that unattractive jobs involving "blood,
unpleasant odors and repetitive tasks" are unable to be filled and are
unwanted by Americans, meatpacking corporations have established
policies that heighten the undesirable nature of these jobs for their own
financial benefit." A lack of job security, insufficient or nonexistent
healthcare benefits, and failure to provide safety at the workplace, in
conjunction with inadequate wage provision continues to plague the
meatpacking industry because their workers - migrant workers lacking
9 WHITTAKER, supra note 90, at 40.
9 BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR, supra note 91, at 13; see also, e.g., David Barboza, Meatpackers' Profit
Hinge on Pod of Immigrant Lar, N.Y. TIEs, Dec. 21, 2001, at A26; Marc Cooper, The Heardand's Raw Deal:
How Meapacking is Creating a New Immigrant Underclass, THE NATION, Feb. 3, 1997, at 11 (reporting that
"[w]ithin a few weeks, say several workers, even some of those deported to Mexico were back on the job.
'They just got some new ID,' says one worker. 'And the same gringos who turned them in hired them back
like nothing had happened.'").
10 See CAROL ANDREAS, MEATPACKERS AND BEEF BARONS: COMPANY TOWN IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 59-82 (1994).
101 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ABUSES AGAINST WORKERS TAINT U.S. MEAT AND POULTRY (Jan.
25, 2005), avalable at http;/www.hrw.org/einews/2005/01/24/abuses-against-workers-taint-us-meat-and-
poultry.
' See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INCIDENCE RATES OF NONFATAL
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILNESSES BYINDUSTRYAND SELECTED CASE TYPES 2001 (2002).
103 See WHITAKER, supra note 90, at 40.
104 Id.
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knowledge of their rights and sometimes fearful because of their alien
status - will not be likely to unionize, or at least will rarely engage in the
same level of rebellion against the norms that the employer seeks to
establish.'05
Meatpacking corporations have been able to enjoy the financial
benefits of low-wage workers who do not demand better working
conditions. Agriprocessors is a prime example of this. Productivity is
maintained without any need to consider worker's rights, higher wages, or
slower line speeds. Furthermore, the industry now relies on high worker
turnover - "turnover is not regarded entirely negative by industry, it may
be a mixed blessing."'" High turnover enables employers to limit health
care coverage to people who have worked for a year or more, grant little or
no vacation time, increase required production levels without fear of
people quitting, and maintain low wages without fear of unionization.
Forty to one hundred percent of workers leave and must be replaced on a
yearly basis,'os but with turnover rates and a constant flow of
undocumented or temporary migrant workers to replace those who leave,
the industry can continue to exploit workers knowing that new workers
can, and will, be recruited.
A. The History of Unions and the Search for a New Model
The tradition and transition of unions has its own story, but the
disappearance of union leverage arguably played a significant role in
creating a climate that has perpetuated exploitation of immigrant labor.
This climate has led experts in the practice of organizing workers to
reexamine the union model and to consider added complexities that build
upon worker fears. While a migrant workforce does not preclude the
possibility of unionization entirely, it substantially minimizes the
likelihood that a union force will take root. The same fears that prevent
migrant workers from complaining on an individual basis often prevent
them from rallying together to demand change. Additionally, because
migrant workers often change jobs or industries, union momentum
among immigrant and migrant groups is more challenging.'09
105 See BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR, supra note 91, at 11&
' WHrT1TAKER, supra note 90, at 48.
107 See Barboza, supra note 99, at A26.
100 W-irTAKER, supra note 90, at 30.
109 Native wage and salary workers are more likely to be union members than foreign-bom workers.
MIGRATION POuCY INST., IMMIGRANT UNION MEMBERS: NUMBERS AND TRENDS (2004), available at
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Labor organization has taken a variety of forms, particularly from the
late 1800s until the emergence of the New Deal. Between 1855 and 1955
the American Federation of Labor ("AFL") organized over 20,000 workers
in various groups."o The AFL issued charters to independent groups
directly permitting them to organize along the lines of individual
professions or trades that connected workers depending on the issues they
faced."' Along the way, unions have attempted to address the
complications that have faced unionization. In instances of high mobility,
unions stress affiliation with an industry rather than a particular job or
placement. In these cases, the worker's primary relationship was with the
union, and as members they were able receive benefits to which
employers contributed funds."2 This was most commonly seen with
hotel and restaurant unions." 3  Nevertheless, the Taft-Hartley
amendments" 4 to the NLRA made the industry-wide attempts to
unionize largely impossible where the amendments made hiring halls and
agreements to hire only union employees illegal."'
Based on the status of the law and the factors previously discussed at
play with a migrant workforce, the traditional model for leveraging
worker rights through union organization typically fails. While
undocumented and documented migrant workers serve many industries
that once relied heavily on union support for their workers, recently
arrived migrant workers are unlikely leaders for forcing workplace-wide
www.migrationpolicy.org/pub7_Immigrant Union Membership.pdf ; see also Rachel Sherman & Kim Voss,
"Organize or Die": Laor's New Tactics and Immigrant Workers, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS 81, 82 (Ruth
Milkman ed., 2000) (union formation and membership requires a new kind of attention in industries
dominated by migrant workers. The momentum that a union attempts to gather in a workplace to force
change is often further challenged by the transitory nature of the migrant workers who in leaving their
workplaces after a short period of employment take with them their mounting frustrations and stories of
mistreatment. Union workers have been forced to reshape their model in order to have an effect on worker
rights).
110 See Dorothy Sue Cobble, Lost Ways of Unionism: Historical Perspecties on Reinventing die LAor
Movement, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT: LABOR'S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY82, 87 (Lowell Turner et al., eds., 2001).
"l See Dorothy Sue Cobble, Organizing dre Postindustrial Work Force: Lssonsfrom the History of Waitres
Unionism, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 419,423 (1991).
112 Id. at 423-24.
113 Id.
114 See 29 U.S.C. S 141 (1947). The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 was designed to amend much of the
NLRA of 1935. Most scholars agree that it was beneficial to management and detrimental to unions. It gives
employees the right to refrain from participating in union activities and adds a series of prohibited unfair labor
practices by unions. See HARRYA. MInUs & EMILY CIARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER Acr TO TAFT-
HARTLEY: A STUDYOF NATIONAL LABOR POLCY AND LABOR RELATIONS 655 (1950).
115 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. S 158(b) (1947).
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change because even though some migrant workers are lawfully
employed, others are undocumented and frequently change jobs and
industries."' Short-term work and subcontracting jobs often place
migrant workers outside of many workplace protection laws.
Furthermore, unions were not historically interested in investing the
effort where the benefits were unlikely."' Largely, immigrants organize
around opportunities to learn about their rights."' Sometimes this creates
a sense of empowerment and lets them know they are legitimate
contributors to the workforce."' Ultimately, however, where the work is
more dispersed, lower paying, and lower skilled, the climate is not ripe for
the emergence of a union voice in migrant worker-dominated workplaces
making worker exploitation more probable where the power balance
between the employer and the employee is so disparate.
IV. AGRIPROCESSORS MEATPACIUNG PLANT: A SHOCKING
EXAMPLE
A. The 2008 Raid
The raid of the Agriprocessors' Iowa meatpacking plant illustrates the
modern day immigration policy's heightened criminalization where
immigration status is at issue.1o It is equally illustrative of the gaps in
legislation and of trends in migrant worker exploitation. In May 2008,
ICE raided Agriprocessors, Inc. of Postville, Iowa, carrying out a criminal
enforcement operation amounting to the largest raid ever executed in a
single workplace.'' Three hundred eighty nine undocumented workers
were arrested. 2 2  Of the original detainees, 314 were male, 76 were
female, and 12 were juveniles." ICE provided the U.S. Attorney's Office
116 See Sherman & Voss, supra note 109, at 82.
117 See JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 3
(2005).
118 See, eg., Evelina Dagnino, On Becoming a Citizen: The Story ofDona Marlene, in 3 MIGRATION AND
IDENTIlY: INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ORAL AND LIFE STORIES 69, 74 (Rina Beniayor & Andor
Skotnes, eds., 1994).
119 Id.
120 Abby Sullivan, On Thin ICE: Cracking Doum on the Racial Profiling of Immigrants and Implementing a
Compassionate Enforcement Policy, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTYLJ. 101, 114 (2008).
121 Julia Preston, Immigrants' Speedy Trial After Raid Become Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,2008, atA12.
1 Julia Preston, 2 Supeimsors Are Anested After Suwp at Meat Plant, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2008, at A13
[hereinafter Preston, Supewisors].
123 Erik Camayd-Freixas, Ph.D., Interpreting After the Lagest ICE Raid in US History.A Personal Account,
N.Y. TIMES,June 13,2008, at 2
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with workers' information, and workers were criminally prosecuted for
social security fraud.124
Most of the workers that ICE apprehended pleaded guilty to
knowingly using false Social Security cards or legal residence documents
to gain employment.'25 Few of the defendants actually knew or
understood what a Social Security number was or what purpose it
served.'26 Federal prosecutors convicted nearly 300 undocumented
workers, most of who were from Guatemala.127  The majority of the
undocumented workers were sentenced to five months in prison."'
Lower level supervisors were indicted first on counts of conspiracy to
harbor undocumented aliens for profit, harboring and aiding and abetting
the harboring of undocumented aliens for profit, conspiracy to commit
document fraud and aiding and abetting document fraud. 29 Upper level
supervisors were arrested and charged with encouraging illegal
immigrants to reside in the U.S. and with aiding and abetting in the
possession and use of fraudulent identification.13
Elizabeth Billmeyer, the former human resources manager for
Agriprocessors, testified at trial that the human resources department
received numerous "no match" letters from the federal government
indicating that various Social Security numbers did not correspond with
the name of the employee using the number.' 3 ' Billmeyer indicated that
just a week before the raid she instructed numerous employees to get new
identification and Social Security numbers or they would be terminated.
Many of these employees staged a walkout during business hours, but in
response, Shalom Rubashkin, operating manager of Agriprocessors, told
these employees that these issues could be resolved if they returned to
work' 32  Brent Beebe and Juan Carlos Guererro-Espinoza, two other
Agriprocessors managers, assisted various Agriprocessors meatpackers in
124 See Prestorn Supervisors, supra note 122, at A13.
12 Julia Preston, An Interpreter Speaking Up for Migrants, N.Y. TIMEs, July 11, 2008, at Al [hereinafter
Preston, Interpreter].
126 See Camayd-Frebixs, supra note 123, at 6.
127 Id. at 2.
128 Julia Preston, Meatpacker Faces Charges of VWlating Child Laws, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 2008, at A16.
129 Press Release, USCIS, ICE and DOJ Joint Enforcement Action at Iowa Meatpacking Plant (May
12,2008), available at httpV/www.ice.gov/pVnews/newsreleases/articles/080512cedarrapids.html.
130 See United States v. Agriprocessors, Inc., No. 08-CR-1324 LRR (N.D. Iowa Nov. 13, 2008)
(sentencing mem.) [hereinafter Sentencing Memorandum], available at httpv/www.iand.uscourts.gov/e-
web/decisions.nsflQ/F8D3CEF81A587C1486257749004DCB35/$Fde/LRR-08-CR-1324,+United+States
+v.+Rubashkin,+Sentencing+Memorandum,+06212010.pdf
131 Id. at 10.
132 Id.
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obtaining fraudulent employment documents for a fee of $4,500 that
Rubashkin agreed to advance to the workers."'
According to an affidavit filed by an ICE agent in conjunction with
the arrests, 76 percent of the 968 employees on the company's payroll
over the three months leading up to the raid used false or suspect Social
Security numbers.134  The affidavit cited unnamed sources who alleged
that some company supervisors even employed 15-year-olds and helped
cash employee checks using fake documents.'
The owner of Agriprocessors meatpacking plant, Aaron Rubashkin,
and his son Sholom, the top manager of the plant when the raid occurred,
were later indicted in a state child labor case on the grounds that
approximately 32 under-age workers, as young as 13, were employed by
Agriprocessors and using saws, knives and other equipment prohibited for
young workers."' In the spring of 2010, Shalom Rubashkin was found
not guilty in the jury trial concerning the child labor violations."' This
was just one small piece of Rubashkin's legal journey.
After much investigation and the re-filing of superseding indictments,
the federal government charged Sholom Rubashkin with federal crimes
including: conspiracy to harbor undocumented aliens for profit;38
harboring and aiding and abetting the harboring of undocumented aliens
for profit;'3 1 conspiracy to commit document fraud;"o aiding and abetting
133 Id. at 11.
134 See In re Search of Agriprocessors, Inc., No. 08-MJ-001 10-JSS (N.D. Iowa, signed May 9, 2008)
(application and affidavit for search warrant). Search Warrant and Affidavit available on the federal court
password required electronic website (PACER).
'3 Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Raidjars a Small Town: Critis Say Emploss Should Be Targeted, WASH.
POST, May 18, 2008, at Al; see als Camayd-Freixas, supra note 123, at 2.
136 See State of Iowa v. Rubashlkin, No. 01031 SMCR009341 (N.D. Iowa); see also Julia Preston,
Meatpacker Is Fined Nealy $10 Million, NY TIMES, Oct 30, 2008, at A22 [hereinafter Preston, Mearpadeer is
Fined].
137 See JeffReinitz, Not Guilty Verdict in Rubashkin Child-Labor Case, KCRG-TV9 NEWSJune 7,2010,
available at http//www.kcrg.com/newslocal/5788809.html.
138 See 8 U.S.C. 5 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), 1324(a)(1)(B)(i) (2002) (making it a crime to engage in any
conspiracy to harbor aliens in disregard of the fact that he or she has come to the U.S. in violation of the law.
Punishment is accorded in those instances where the offense was committed for the purpose of "commercial
advantage or private financial gain").
139 See id. 5 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv), 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(Il), 1324(a)(1)(B)(i) (coupling conspiracy to
harbor aliens in disregard of the fact that he or she has come to the U.S. in violation of the law and broadens
the scope of the charge to those aiding and abetting in the harboring of those aliens).
140 Cf 18 U.S.C. 5 371 (1948) (revealing how this provision is tied to the scheme whereby
Agriprocessors' managers aided undocumented aliens in securing false Social Security numbers).
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document fraud;141 bank fraud;142 false statements and reports to a bank;143
wire fraud;'" mail fraud;'45 money laundering and aiding and abetting.'46
Eventually Postville workers were offered a uniform plea agreement
and told by federal prosecutors through an interpreter' 7 that they had
three options.148 The first option provided that they could plead guilty to
"knowingly using a false Social Security number."4 9 By pleading guilty,
the worker would serve five months in jail and be deported without a
hearing.'" In the alternative, if the worker pleaded not guilty, the
individual would remain in jail for six to eight months before trial without
the right to bail.'"' If the worker won at trial, the individual would be
deported afterward anyway, and finally, if the worker pleaded not guilty
and then lost at trial, he or she would go to jail for at least two years, and
then be deported.'52 This plea offer was only available for seven days from
the time of the raid. 53
Labor law violations have also been considered in part of
Agriprocessors' penalties. State labor authorities levied nearly $9.6 million
141 The prosecution will have to prove that the individual possessed or used a Resident Alien Card
that was unlawfully obtained and that when the individual used it he or she knew it was unlawfully obtained.
See id. 5 1546(a). This provision expands the scope of the individuals encompassed in the document fraud by
including others who commit "an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures its commission." Id. S 2.
142 See id. S 1343.
4 See id. 1014.
144 See id. 1343.
145 See id. 1341.
146 See 18 U.S.C. S 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (1986); id. 5 2 (1948) (expanding the scope of
the individuals encompassed in the money laundering by including others who commit "an offense against
the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission.").
147 See Preston, Interpreter, supra note 125, at Al.
148 Erik Camayd-Freixas, a professor of Spanish at Florida International University, was summoned
as an interpreter to Iowa by court officials to translate in the hearings for the illegal immigrant workers
arrested. He later detailed his account of the process involved in the days following the raid, which has
illuminated many of the details concerning the proceedings. He noted, in particular, the fast pace of the
proceedings and the pressure prosecutors brought to bear on the defendants and their lawyers by pressing
criminal charges instead of deporting the workers immediately for immigration violations. See Camayd-
Freixas, supra note 123, at 4-7.
149 Id. at 5.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See id.; Kim Bobo, Dispatches from die Workplaw: Postiille: Ground Zero jor dre Intersection of Immgrant
and Workers' Rights, REUGION DISPATcHES, Aug. 6, 2008, available at httpAvww.religiondispatches.org/
archive migratiorn/493/dispatches from the workplace:postville:ground zero for the intersection of i
mmigrantand workersE2/o80%99 rights.
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in fines for illegal paycheck deductions: for example, the company made
workers pay for "protective jackets and other uniforms that packinghouse
workers were required to wear."'" Officials determined that workers
wages were reduced by nearly $200,000 and Agriprocessors also failed to
give final paychecks to many of the workers arrested in the raid."' The
company was also fined nearly $400,000 for illegally deducting a sales tax
from worker's paychecks.' 6  Furthermore, an investigation into
Agriprocessors' payroll records indicated that managers at the
corporation's headquarters might have violated overtime and record-
keeping provisions of FLSA."' The raid was just the beginning of an
ongoing dilemma that revealed to the rest of the country the extent of the
immigration issues facing today's workforce.
While the undocumented workers suffered no small penalty being
jailed and eventually deported despite having suffered atrocious and illegal
work conditions, the operators of Agiprocessors continued to face the
wrath of the federal prosecutors and the media for months. After a year's
worth of procedural challenges by both the government and defendant-
Rubashkin, in July 2009, Sholom Rubashkin was indicted on a total of 163
counts of federal violations including immigration and financial crimes. 5 s
The saga continued for months. Rubashkin and his lawyers argued
that the media backlash undermined Rubashkin's right to due process.
They put forth various motions to dismiss and a motion for change of
venue. 59 In June 2009, the court granted Rubashkin's motion to sever the
financial-related charges from the immigration charges.6 o The motion
for change of venue was resubmitted by Rubashkin and was granted in
September 2009 moving the trial to South Dakota.161 Sholom Rubashkin
refused a plea bargain maintaining his innocence and a jury found the
154 Preston, Metpacker is Fined, supra note 136, at A22.
155 Id.
156 Id.
1 See Grant Schulte, Posvi&le Probe Focuses on 9 Detainees, DES MoINES REGISTER, Oct. 2, 2008.
158 See United States v. Agriprocessors, Inc., No. 08-CR-1324 LRR, (N.D. Iowa 2008) (indictment)
(after the initial indictment, filed in 2008, seven superseding indictments were filed leading up to theJuly 2009
indictment).
'5 See United States v. Agriprocessors, Inc., No. 08-CR-1324 LRR, (N.D. Iowa 2008) (docket).
1to See United States v. Agriprocessors, Inc., No. 08-CR-1324 LRR, 2009 WL 1853218, at *9 (N.D.
Iowa June 25, 2009) ("The court holds severance is necessary to preserve the rights of Defendants Rubashkin
and Agriprocessors to a fair trial.").
161 See United States v. Agriprocessors, Inc., No. 08-CR-1324 LRR, (N.D. Iowa Sept. 1, 2009) (order
granting defendant's motion for change of venue).
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Agriprocessors former manager guilty on 86 out of 91 financial fraud-
related charges on November 13, 2009.162
Rubashkin was scheduled to stand trial on December 2, 2009 in Sioux
Falls, South Dakota for the 72 immigration charges.'" On November 19,
2009, Federal Judge Linda Reade dismissed the remaining immigration-
related charges against Rubashkin in response to the government's
motion." Having convicted the former CEO on the more extensive
financial fraud charges, the U.S. Attorney General insisted that, in the
interest of conserving judicial resources, no additional proceedings would
be necessary or desired."'s Thus, one of biggest immigration raids of the
century resulted in no immigration penalty actually being assessed against
the employer-violator.
B. Legal Controversies: A Refusal to Change
Legal controversy is not new to Agriprocessors, Inc. In a separate
case, the company was confronted by legal challenges before, and at the
time of, the raid. Agriprocessors was facing suits by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA")" and challenges by its New York workers
trying to unionize."' Workers continued to allege that Agriprocessors
paid below minimum wage, failed to pay overtime, and immediately
terminated employment of workers who complained about conditions or
wages. 168
162 United States v. Rubashkin, No. 08-CR-1324 LRR (N.D. Iowa Nov. 13, 2009) (jury verdict); see
also Grant Schulte, Kosher Slaughterhoue Manager Convicted of Fraud, USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 2009, available at
httpV/www.usatoday.cominews/natiorV2009-11-13-slaughterhouse-guilty-verdict N.htm.
163 See United States v. Rubashkin, No. 08-CR-1324 LRR (N.D. Iowa Nov. 19, 2009) (United
States' Motion to Dismiss) [hereinafter U.S. Motion to Dismiss].
' See United States v. Rubashkin, No. 08-CR-1324 LRR (N.D. Iowa Nov. 19, 2009) (order
granting United States' Motion to Dismiss).
165 See U.S. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 163.
16 NICCW v. AgriProcessors, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 666,669-70 (N.D. Iowa 2006) ("On December
1, 2004, the United States, on behalf of the EPA, filed a Complaint against Defendant AgriProcessors, Inc.
The Complaint allegeld] that AgriProcessors repeatedly violated various federal environmental laws, including
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. S 1251 et seq., the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act ("EPCRA"), 42 U.S.C. 5 11001 et seq., and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. S 7470 et seq. . . .
On December 14, 2004, a local environmental group, Northeast Iowa Citizens for Clean Water ("NICCW"),
filed a motion to consolidate [with the U.S. suit]. NICCW also allege[d) that AgriProcessors stored and
applied paunch waste without a permit, in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. 5 6901 et seq., and maintained an open dump, in violation of lowa Code 5 455B307.").
167 See Agri Processor Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 2-3 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
168 See Nathaniel Popper, In Rubashkins' Backyard, Another Tale of Labor Sife: Kosher Giant Tuns to
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C. A New York Case
In September 2005, workers at Agriprocessors' distribution site in
Brooklyn, New York, voted to join the United Food and Commercial
Workers union ("UFCW") and the vote succeeded but Agriprocessors
refused to recognize the union.' Agriprocessors claimed that because the
majority of workers who voted were in the U.S. illegally, their votes were
invalid.170 Agriprocessors appealed again and again.'"
Agriprocessors refused to bargain with the union and in response the
union filed unfair labor practice charges under section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the NLRA.172 The National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") general
counsel issued a complaint against the company where the Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ") "sustained the charged violations[ I and ordered
Agriprocessors to bargain with the union."" The company filed
exceptions to the ALJ's decision.'74 The NLRB unanimously affirmed the
ALJ's decision and again ordered Agriprocessors to bargain with the
*175union.
The company petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review of the
decision. 76 In AgriProcessor Co. v. NLRB, Agriprocessors argued that since
IRCA made it illegal to employ undocumented workers, these
"employees" were not protected by the NLRA." Furthermore,
Agriprocessors argued that the undocumented workers could not belong
Supreme Court in Fight with Immigrants, JEWISH DAILY FoRWARD, Aug. 14, 2008, available at
http//www.forward.co/article/13997/ [hereinafter Popper, In Rubashkins'Backyard].
169 See id.
170 NLRA grants protection to undocumented workers for precisely these allegations. See National
Labor Relations Act S 8(a)(1), (5), 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(1), (5) (1974).
17 See Popper, In Rubashkins'Badkyard, supra note 168.
172 10 Processor, 514 F.3d at 2.
173 Id. at 3.
174 Id. at 2-3.
175 Id. at 3.
176 See id.
177 See Brief of Petitioner at 25-26, Agri Processor Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(No. 06-1329). Compare Agri Processor, 514 F.3d at 12 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("Applying the
straightforward Sure-Tan analysis in the wake of IRCA, I would hold that an illegal immigrant worker is not an
'employee' under the NLRA because Congress has now made it illegal for illegal immigrants to be
employed."), with 29 U.S.C. S 152(3) (1978) ("The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not
be limited to the employees of a particular employer .. .but shall not include any individual employed as an
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service ofany family or person at his home, or any individual employed
by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual
employed as a supervisor . .. or by any other person who is not an employee as herein defined.").
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to the same bargaining unit as the legal workers, and therefore the
bargaining unit created by the NLRB was improper."' The D.C. Circuit
denied these arguments and upheld the NLRB decision, ruling that
Agriprocessors must recognize the union."' The court referred to Sure-
Tan v. NLRB,'" a 1984 U.S. Supreme Court decision granting
undocumented immigrants protection under the NLRA, disagreeing with
the Agriprocessors argument."'" Moreover, the court found that nothing
in the text of the IRCA expressly or implicitly alters the NLRA's
definition of "employee."'" The court also pointed to the legislative
history of the IRCA, which showed that the IRCA was not intended to
limit the scope of the term "employee" in the NLRA.'" Agriprocessors
appealed the decision, and at the end ofJune petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court to hear the case.'"
The arguments presented in the Agriprocessors case challenging
unionization in New York appear to undercut the statements made by the
Agriprocessors' spokespersons following the Iowa raid regarding the
company's lack of knowledge about the employment of undocumented
workers at their facility."' The claim made in the Brooklyn case that the
company had evidence that undocumented workers participated in the
union vote indicates that, at a national level, the company was aware they
were employing undocumented workers, and, in fact, were willing to
maintain those workers' employ until the controversy regarding union
membership arose.' In Iowa, Agriprocessors argued in the alternative
that the employers had no such knowledge."*
It was in the middle of the strike that the company first made its legal
objection to the immigration status of its workers; according to the
company's Supreme Court petition, Agriprocessors verified the Social
178 Brief of Petitioner at 25-27,AgiProcemsor, 514 F.3d 1 (No. 06-1329).
179 See Agri Processon, 514 F.3d at 8.
ISO 467 U.S. 883, 890 (1984) (holding undocumented aliens were included within the definition of
"employee" for purposes of the NLRA and that the application of the NLRA to undocumented aliens was
consistent with the mandate of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101 (1982)).
' SeeAgriProcessor, 514 F.3d at 3. Despite Sure-Tan being a pre-Hoffinan case the controlling opinion
is wholly convinced that Agriprocessor's argument ignores the "plain language" of the Supreme Court's
decision in Sure-Ta. Id
182 Id. at 4.
183 See id.
184 Popper, In Rubashkins' Badryrd, supra note 168.
185 See id.; Adam Belz, Agriprcessors Hires IeglAssistnce, CEDAR RAPIDS GAZErrE, June 6, 2008, at
B1.
' See Popper, In Rubashkins' Bard, suprn note 168.
187 BeIz, supra note 185, at Bi.
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Security numbers of all the employees and "discovered that of the 21
workers who voted in the election, the Social Security numbers of only
four matched Social Security records with the same name."'88  This
finding implies that the company knew that they were employing
undocumented or at least improperly documented workers in New York
and they were in the practice of verifying worker documents. Since the
Iowa raid in May 2008, the company has not made the same distinctions it
attempted in Brooklyn. Instead, Agriprocessors spokesmen have repeated
that the company did not know it was employing undocumented
workers. "
D. Back in Iowa
Further evidence of Agriprocessors' knowledge about the staff's
immigration status appeared a year prior to the raid in Iowa. On May 18,
2007 the Jewish Daily Forward reported that earlier in the week workers
engaged in a walkout in response to a letter Agriprocessors issued to many
employees.'90 This was later reiterated in employee testimony.191
Between 200 and 300 employees left their posts during the morning shift
to protest a May 4 letter sent by the company's management informing
workers that in order to keep theirjobs they would need to reconcile their
Social Security numbers with federal records. Again, this pattern of
behavior on the part of Agriprocessors indicates the human resources
department knew as early as 2002,'" prior to the now infamous raid, that
Agriprocessors was employing undocumented workers and that they
engaged some rudimentary (albeit flawed) system of checking
documents. 4
Despite the fact that Rubashkin, the plant's operating manager, was
quoted in one newspaper as saying, "[t]he people that checked in [that]
morning stayed until the end of the shift,"'95 the walkout was reported in
'8 Popper, In Rubashkins' Backyard, supra note 168.
189 See id.
19 See Nathaniel Popper, Kosher Slaughterhouse Hit with Lawsuits, JEWSH DAiLY FORWARD, May 18,
2007, avadable at httpV/www.forward.con/articles/10740/ [hereinafter Popper, Kosher Slaughterhouse].
191 See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 130, at 10.
192 Popper, KoAer Slaughterhouse, supra note 190.
193 See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 130, at 10.
194 The only other possible explanation or argument that could be made on Agriprocessors' behalf
would be that the company believed the "threat" of terminating improperly documented workers would lay
the groundwork for a later denial of their knowledge of illegal workers should a controversy arise.
195 Josh Nelson, Union Alleas Questions About Documentation Prompts Walkout at Agrprocessors, THE
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other local Iowa news outlets.' Workers from the strike told thejewish
Daily Forward that the walkout ended after Rubashkin came out and told
the workers that he would try to fix the Social Security problem.'97 The
mere fact that some workers' documents were not in order should have
placed Agriprocessors on notice that they were employing at least some
undocumented workers which undermines their submission that they
were unaware of any undocumented employees on staff at the time of the
May raid.'98
Agriprocessors is arguably one of the most significant offenders of
workplace regulation whether with regard to allegations of immigration,
health and safety, payment violations, and even violation of child labor
laws. In spite of the egregious nature of the violations, the ongoing and
repetitive litigation is testament to the reality that the law fails to deter or
prevent employers from engaging in violative behavior.' 99
The arguments put forth by Agriprocessors in its separate litigation
efforts illustrate that there is a tremendous lack of cohesion in labor
legislation permitting inconsistent submissions on the part of employers
and that states are failing to cooperate or coordinate their efforts against
like employers. This case illustrates the growing need for reform with
regard to labor legislation, particularly emphasizing outside enforcement
or monitoring and interagency, interstate cooperation.
V. LOOKING OUTSIDE THE CASES: GETTING OUT OF THE BIND
Agriprocessors' conduct is illustrative of an extreme instance of what
will occur when there is no deterrent for employers engaged in the
practice of hiring undocumented migrant employees. As was the case,
Agriprocessors maintained a position of weighing the cost of breaking the
law against the cost of getting caught. For these employers, the choice is
an easy one where they take advantage of a migrant workforce seeking
employment opportunities that allow them to work "under the radar."
Agriprocessors arrived at the conclusion that the litigation or potential
COURUM, May 8, 2007, available at http//ww.wcfcouier.con-/articles2007/05/0Wnews/
regionaV91ccb74803deba48862572d5004ld5b9.txt; se also Popper, Kosher Slaughterhouse, supra note 190.
1% See Popper, Kosher Slauhterhtouse, supra note 190.
197 Id.
198 The Rubashkin family denied any criminal activity to various news sources. Aaron Rubashkin said
that he did not know "workers were illegal and that they had produced what appeared to be legitimate work
documents." Ben Harris, Rubashkin: It's AA Lie, JTA- THEGLBAL NEWS SERVICE OF THEJEWISH PEOPLE,
June 3,2008, available at httpfta.org'news/article/200WO6'3/18898/aaronrubashkin.
' Cf Fuller, supra note 77, at 1003.
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stigma of conducting business in this manner was less problematic than
either paying minimum wages or employing legal workers.20 The
persistence with which companies like Agriprocessors maintain the
position that their conduct is not illegal demands that legislators
reexamine the laws and that the judiciary reconsider their inconsistent
application of those laws.
The strongest opposition to advocating labor rights comes from those
insisting on the need for flexibility as a requirement for economic growth.
The argument posited by advocates of less regulation insists that because
regulation generates higher production costs, making basic production
more expensive - "developing countries lose the incentives they have to
attract foreign investment and to develop through increased
productivity."20 1 This position argues that the pursuit of basic human
rights stagnates foreign economies. An improvement in labor standards
should arise from increase in capital where productivity is enhanced, not
an insistence on the rights themselves.202
There are many ways of looking at the issue of immigrant labor in the
U.S., but two theories in particular have been adopted by popular culture.
First emerges the idea that immigrant workers accept the jobs that
industries need filled - jobs that most Americans will not take under the
same conditions. With the ability to pay these workers less, the consumer
benefits as well as the industry; suppliers can maintain lower prices in the
marketplace. Looking at this issue in terms of cost-analysis and the
economic benefits of profiting industry, migrant workers provide financial
gain for all Americans and provide individuals in search of employment
with a job.203 The second theory posits that permitting undocumented
workers to fill those jobs drives down the baseline for low-wage work and
promotes employer exploitation of the worker; immigrant workers
compete with American workers for low-level unskilled labor and are
willing to take those jobs for less than minimum wage.2 04
Current immigration policy undoubtedly has had some role in the
rising disparity in wealth distribution. "What we thus see is that
immigration may help those . . . employers or service consumers,
especially in the upper reaches of society, and it may help the immigrants
2W Cf Preston, Meatpacker is Fined, supra note 136, at A22.
201 Michael Pirret, American LAbor Unions and Free Trade Agreements: A Strugle for Compatiiiy, 50
WAYNE L REv. 1257,1271 (2005).
W See id. at 1272.
M See BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR, supra note 91, at 107.
M' Id.
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themselves. But immigration hurts those who are already in the most
precarious economic and social situation[s]." 2 05  It creates the ultimate
bind for employers to tackle, and neither of the two commonly
understood immigration paradigms provide employers with a good
solution. Both paradigms tend to ignore the aspect of human rights and
the obligations they impose in terms of health, safety, and a right to be
paid. Furthermore, both ideologies also tend to suggest that market forces
do not inherently realign the balance.
Two changes should occur. First, legislation should be revised so as
to return to the pre-Hofiman era where the employer pays back pay.206
This must come in the form of federal legislation to make the standard
uniform throughout the country, regardless of the industry. Second, the
U.S. should engage in serious conversation with the international
community to establish more concrete standards of international labor
rights that conform with a modem understanding that a right to work and
be paid is a human right under international law regardless of nationality
or immigration status.
A. Rethinking Hoffman - One Avenuefor Change
This first proposition is not to suggest that the rights of
undocumented workers should be unlimited; as it is, the undocumented
workforce puts companies trying to abide by the laws in the position of
competing with rival businesses who employ undocumented workers,
break the law, and produce more cheaply by doing so.207 To allow
employers to profit from their own failure to uphold minimum legal
standards, however, is the beginning of the demise of standards in the
workplace. Justice Breyer foresaw precisely these consequences and
expressed his position in his 2002 Hoffman dissent.208
In his dissenting opinion in Hoffman, Breyer attacked the policy-based
arguments advanced by the majority which contended that federal
immigration policy foreclosed the NLRB from awarding back pay because
it "not only trivializes the immigration laws, it also condones and
Ms David Abraham, DoingJustie on Two Fronts, 33 ETHNIC& c RAcIAL STUD. 968 (2009).
206 I will elaborate on this further in Part VA I do not advocate that this back pay go directly to
undocumented workers or in any way reward these individuals for their illegal behavior. I will propose that a
federal fund be created whereby the employer does not continue to profit from employing illegal workers. See
discussion infra Part VA
2 See Peter H. Schuck, The Morality ofImnagration Poliy, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 865, 883 (2008).
208 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 153-61 (2002) (Breyer,J., dissenting).
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encourages future violations."20 Breyer argued that the legislature did not
intend for the IRCA to remove any authority from the NLRB; 210 rather
the predominant purpose of the IRCA was to diminish the forces that
attract undocumented workers to seek employment in the U.S. Breyer
argued that awarding back pay actually supports immigration policy - it
does not undermine it.2 11
Justice Breyer did not believe that awarding back pay would play a
large role in pulling undocumented workers into the United States. He
reasoned that when the illegal workers are coming into the country they
are not realistically considering the possibility of future employer abuses
and the legal remedies available to them. 2 12  From the employer side,
however, he contended that withholding back pay would increase the
strength of the forces that draw employers to recruit and seek out
undocumented workers because it makes it more profitable for employers
to hire and exploit these workers in ways not possible with legally
documented employees.213 Apart from the NLRB requiring that an
employer provide back pay as a remedial tool, the other remaining
remedies only impose future obligations; the NLRB has no other control
over past conduct. Justice Breyer argued that these remaining remedies
are insufficient in their deterrent effect on employers.2 14 With the ability
to retain profits from unlawful labor practices and no real potential for
anybody to rectify past acts, employers may be willing to take a chance on
an unfair labor practice; employers can be assured that the worst-case
scenario for an initial offense is being required to terminate the activity.215
Nevertheless, to the extent that the Hoffman majority relies on the
statutory language of IRCA to suggest that an undocumented worker is
engaging in illegal behavior by "subvert[ing] the employer verification
system by tendering fraudulent documents," 2 16 it would appear that they
correctly conclude that, "it is impossible for an undocumented alien to
obtain employment in the United States without some party directly
2 Id. at 150.
210 See id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing H.R Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1 at 58 (stating that the
Committee did not intend for employer sanctions provisions of the bill be used to undermine labor
protections in existing law, or to limit the powers of federal or state labor relations boards)).
211 See id. at 153.
212 Id. at 155.
213 Id.
214 See Hoffan, 535 U.S. at 154 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
2 See id. at 155-56.
216 Id. at 148 (referring to IRCA, 8 U.S.C. S 1324c(a)(1)-(3)).
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contravening explicit congressional policies."217 But to this end, they do
not go so far as to overturn Sure-Tan.2 18
As a matter of legal interpretation, there may be an argument that an
undocumented worker cannot be an employee as contemplated by the
NLRA, but the undocumented worker was employed and did work for the
employer. The employer must not reap benefit from having violated the
same law that constrains the undocumented worker from being able to
obtain back pay.
Thus, if it was Congress' intent under IRCA to require that, "legality
of residence be a pre-condition to employment,"" then the proper
solution would encourage this conduct. Rather than explicitly prohibiting
the NLRB from awarding back pay for undocumented workers, IRCA
should require that the payment still be made, but that it be collected in a
federal fund so as to prevent both the undocumented worker and the
employer from reaping the benefit of his or her illegal acts.2 20 This type of
government-managed account might serve the more neutral middle
ground by dis-incentivizing the exploitation of immigrant workers; it
would neither penalize nor reward the employer for hiring
undocumented workers, but simply put the employer in the financial
position that the law in all respects requires. To some degree, such a
solution resembles a pre-Hoffman stance, but it recognizes the need to
deter employers from engaging in the sort of cost-benefit analysis that
permits them to choose to break the law and simultaneously avoid
rewarding the undocumented worker.
B. Turning to the International Playing Field - A Second Avenuefor Change
A second and subsidiary method of restructuring the U.S. conception
of immigration and labor requires looking at a global concept of
workplace rights. The Agriprocessors raid and the failure of domestic law
217 Id.
218 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (affirming the NLRB's determination that the
application of the NLRA to employment practices affecting aliens would not conflict with the terms of the
INA). Somewhat ironically, in 2008 the D.C Circuit in Agi Pacessor Co., Inc. v. NLRB cites to Sure-Tan for
the proposition that the text of IRCA neither expressly or implicitly alters the NLRA's definition of
"employee." See Agri Proessor, 514 F.3d 1, 4 (2008). This would seem to indicate the reemergence of a pre-
Hoffman stance.
219 See H.R Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 2 at 12 (1986).
22 There are any number of possible uses for the fund, including filtering the money back into
bolstering immigration or labor enforcement; funding the deportation of the illegal workers to their home
country, or funding the implementation of effective guestworker programs.
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to restrain employers requires consideration of other means of reform.
Characterizing workplace immigration violations as human rights abuses
would recognize thatjobs and employers in the U.S. are not above the law
or the emerging global standards of human rights. Recognizing the
aforementioned limitations of domestic law, and particularly in a
globalized economy where goods as well as employees traverse national
borders, theorists and analysts worldwide have begun to reconsider labor
rights under the umbrella of human rights. Some suggest that the status
of human rights themselves are still viewed contentiously and that it
would, therefore, be a mistake to consider labor rights in that context.221
Others contend that the framework for considering labor rights should be
redirected to the context of moral-legal worldviews.222 Ultimately, the
global community agrees that hazardous work conditions, harsh
discipline, and restrictions on freedom to associate are abuses that require
regulation.22 They echo forms of slavery and "provoke moral outrage."224
While it may not seem vital where no enforcement mechanism is in place,
rhetoric does matter.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") reflects
common labor rights such as freedom from slavery,225 non-discrimination
and equal protection,226 and freedom to associate. These basic
principles are recognized as rights under both the UDHR and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR").22' Furthermore, Inter-American Court on Human Rights
also determined that various labor rights are fundamental and must be
respected by member countries under the tenet of non-discrimination. 229
221 See Philip Alston, Labour Rights as Human Rights. The Not So Happy State of the Art, in LABOR
RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
M See David C. Yamada, Human Dignity andAmerican Employmtent Lw, 43 U. RICH. L REv. 523,539-
40(2009).
3 Charles Sabel et al., Ratcheting Labor Standans: Regulation for Continuous Imprnment in the Global
Workplace 4 (Columbia Law & Economic Working Paper No. 185, 2000), available at
httpV/papers.ssm.corr/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=253833.
224 Id.
=5 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A, art. 5, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
226 Id. art. 7.
227 Id. art. 20.
2 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
M9 Where migrant workers are concerned, there are certain rights that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights assumes are of fundamental importance and yet are often violated. Some of these include the
prohibition of obligatory or forced labor, the prohibition and abolition of child labor; special care for women
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Because these are affirmative rights, they impose an affirmative duty
as opposed to just a negative prohibition on an employer. For example,
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has also stated that once an
immigrant worker enters into an employment relationship, "the migrant
acquires rights as a worker, which must be recognized and guaranteed,
irrespective of his regular or irregular status in the State of
employment."20 The recognition that an employee acquires rights should
impose a reciprocal duty on the employer to uphold those rights.23
Using this as the foundation, the international human rights platform
has the potential to establish a dominant, homogeneous framework for
labor rights on a world scale. Admittedly, because the enforcement
mechanisms at the international level are not as strong as those in
domestic contexts, it is difficult to imagine certain practical elements of
enforcement. It is possible, however, to perpetuate the international
platform in domestic rhetoric and look to international institutions to
restructure the principles of workplace rights. Various international
agreements like the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
("NAALC"), 2 and the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") have already begun to do so in the international sphere."
workers, and the rights corresponding to freedom of association and to organize and join a trade union,
collective negotiation, fair wages for work performed, social security, judicial and administrative guarantees, a
working day of reasonable length with adequate working conditions (safety and health), rest and
compensation. Protection of these rights for migrants has great importance based on the principle of the
inalienable nature of such rights, which all workers possess, irrespective of their migratory status.
Furthermore, the fundamental principle of human dignity is embodied in Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration, according to which "[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, UDHR, GA Res. 217A, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
230 Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion, OC-18,
Inter-Am. C.H.R, Report No. 18/03 (2003).
2' Arguably, this is precisely the notion that Hoffiman rejected in stating that the immigrant, Castro,
"was never lawfully entitled to be present or employed in the United States, and thus, under the plain
language of Sure-Tan, he has no right to claim backpay." Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535
U.S. 137, 148 (2002).
232 NAALC was signed on September 14, 1993, by the Presidents of Mexico and the United States,
and the Prime Minister of Canada, and became effective on January 1, 1994. NAALC was drafted as an
addendum to NAFTA to provide a means by which member countries ensure the effective enforcement of
domestic labor standards and laws without interfering with the functioning of the different national labor
systems. See Secretariat of the Comm'n for Labor Cooperation, The North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, httpV/www.naalc.org/naalc.htrn (last visited Feb. 14,2010).
2 See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat
2057 (the goal of NAFTA was to do away with barriers of trade and investment between the U.S., Canada and
Mexico. NAFTA eliminated tariffl on more than one half of U.S. imports from Mexico and more than one
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Independently, the U.S. can use international law as a means of
establishing a check on the internal U.S. policy concerning worker's
rights. The argument can be made that the U.S. would have no
motivation to turn over its authority to enforce legal obligations to an
international body. Nonetheless, given the heated debates that exist
regarding immigration that can be contrasted with the general consensus
that the domestic laws are inadequate regardless of their purpose, it is time
to look outside of box of strategies previously attempted. Domestic law
can profit by including human rights discourse as a way of interpreting
labor rights. Moreover, the U.S. is a poor example of a country
attempting to implement international labor rights standards.234 The U.S.
illustrates a hypocrisy that weakens the American position on these
principles when it attempts to advocate for labor rights abroad.
In recent years, the U.S. has denounced nations, such as China, for
poor labor laws and human rights violations in the workplace." This
critical perspective toward foreign issues is being mismanaged if it is not
also applied inward to domestic industry; the application of international
law the U.S. demands from other countries must be implemented at
home. While often the issue lies in enforcement capacity, other times
"U.S. law itself fails to meet international norms."" International law, on
the other hand, has a broader community of supporters and thus a broader
community of critics. The international community enforces
international law, but the U.S. often takes the lead in acting to enforce
that legal code." With labor law barely enforced, and immigration
policed by ICE to address an immigration rather than labor agenda, the
U.S. does not provide a promising example of how to proceed with
effective labor regulation.
The International Labor Organization ("ILO") was established as an
agency of the League of Nations in the Treaty of Versailles, which ended
World War I.23 It was intended that the ILO pursue a vision based on the
premise that peace requires reasonable treatment of working people." At
third of U.S. exports to Mexico. These multinational agreements have the ability to leverage economic
freedoms with implementation of international worker rights provisions).
2 See Alston, supra note 221, at 3-4.
235 See Paul Richter, Hillary Clinton Promises to Press Rights Issues with China, LA TIMES, Feb. 16,2009,
availabk at http/www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-clintonl6-2009febl6,0,1047566.story.
236 BLOOD, SWFAT, AND FEAR, supra note 91, at 17.
2 See id.
2 See Carol Riegernan, War-Time Trade-Union and Socialist Propaals, in ORIGINS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 55-78 Games Brown Scott ed., 1934).
2 See id.
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its inception, there was significant controversy about the power retained
by the ILO. The British proposed establishing an international parliament
to enact labor laws that each member of the League would be required to
implement.240  The U.S. was opposed to the idea of an international
parliament and proposed instead that the international body be authorized
only to make recommendations and leave enforcement to the League of
Nations.24 1 In the end, the U.S. proposal was adopted and in 1946 the
ILO became the first specialized agency of the UN.242 Under this plan,
and as it stands today, there is nothing forcing ILO's position or the
standards it recommends.
Furthermore, while the ILO accepted the Declaration of Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, a declaration the U.S. firmly supported,
the U.S. "has not ratified some of the conventions related to the
declaration's principles and rights."243 As a member of the ILO, the U.S.
is required to abide by these standards whether ratified or not; this lack of
ratification, however, demonstrates a lack of cooperation on the part of the
government to abide by regulations we demand from fellow members of
the ILO. As the U.S. attempts to both eliminate the export ofjobs and to
eradicate violative working conditions abroad, American industry has itself
begun importing "developing country employment conditions."244
Because the U.S. and its citizens do not think about violations in domestic
workplaces as human rights issues in the same way that these same
individuals might think about them occurring abroad, there is a deep
chasm in the most basic perspective that drives those most likely to voice a
concern and catalyze the enforcement process.
240 See id. (describing proposals for an international body to govern labor laws after World War I).
241 Id. at 76-78.
242 Id.
243 BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR, supra note 91, at 20.
244 The sort of low labor cost that employers and manufacturers look for in exporting production
abroad are present in the United States along with the lax health, safety, and environmental enforcement,
imposed upon vulnerable, exploited workers. If we are to even consider the argument that exporting labor to
developing countries where workplace conditions are substandard on the premise that it has the potential to
promote foreign economies, reverting to exploitative workplace practices in the United States represents a
disconnect that does not align with that paradigm. See Lourdes Gouveia, Gilod Strategies and Laal Linkags:
The Case of die U.S. Meatpacking Industry, in FROM COLUMBUS TO CONAGRA THE GLoBALzATION OF
AGRICULTURE AND FOOD 125,128-29 (Alessandro Bonanno ed., 1994) (expressing the view that the United
States, despite the market desire to export labor, has embraced developing country's work standards). But see
Pirret, supra note 201, at 1271 (explaining that by increasing investment in developing countries improvement
in productivity will eventually improve human capital, increase wages, and improve a nation's living
standards).
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The power to improve the common denominator concerning
workplace standards rests in transnational regulatory bodies like the ILO
or in finding mechanisms by which these standards can be applied in
national domestic legislative bodies.245 Employing the rhetoric of human
rights provides the mechanism for advancing the rights of people regardless
of their status without necessarily contravening the rights of the sovereign
state. In the U.S., this is typically implemented as a policy statement that
will fuel the attempt to achieve a greater goal where the state-level policy
fails.246 Simon Deakin, a professor of law at the University of Cambridge,
asserts that this either encourages a race to the top or to the bottom, but
neither result is assured.247 Proposing this internationally recognized
mechanism would not overshadow the state level policy, but rather act as
the minimum standard by which workers seek relief as individuals.
Abroad, the purpose of establishing harmonized standards is not to
replace or even supplement the state-level legislation. Rather, these
standards seek to establish the baseline of rights beneath which no local
level approach may descend.24 8 Furthermore, this mechanism builds in a
means of self-regulation where relevant provisions take effect by means of
"workplace agreement."249 By harmonizing the regulatory mechanisms in
this way, the method does not diminish the perpetuation of diverse
regulatory competition, but it does uniformly combat the "deregulatory
effects of globalization."250 Consequently, recognizing the ILO to have
more of the type of power the British proposal required at its inception
would give the ILO the force of law to truly regulate and enforce
according to internationally recognized standards.
While an international solution does not account for all of the
perverse incentives at home in the U.S. regarding immigration and low-
wage labor, these mechanisms can serve to bolster the U.S. rhetoric
against working environments that otherwise fall between the cracks of
domestic labor and immigration laws.
245 See Simon Deakin, Socida lahs in a Globalized Eaonomy, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HuMAN RIGHTS
25, 47 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
246 See id. at 49.
247 Id. at 51.
248 Cf id. at 50.
249 See id.
2M Id. at 51.
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1. Failed Corporate Responsibility
A "corporation" is rarely tied to one and only one individual; it is
regarded as more of a nebulous entity and this detached rhetoric assists an
employer in his or her capacity to reconcile workplace violations - the
failure to pay minimum wage and the exploitation of vulnerable
undocumented workers - strictly in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. As
early in the United States' history as 1819, in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,25 1 Justice Marshall explained the legal standard for a
corporation. "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence." 252  This
"artificial" characterization does not alleviate the responsibility of the
corporate entity from making decisions that comport with a sense of
morality or with ethical norms.
Nevertheless, the characterization of a corporation is primarily
effected by external factors including social and market forces as well as
the individual consciences of the corporate managers.253 Ultimately, the
stigma of being characterized as a corporation that violates labor standards
and avoids wage payment obligations has not had the deterrent effect one
would expect. Many employers do what the law requires to avoid
penalties for noncompliance, 254 but many also use the law as leverage over
workers, authorized and unauthorized, to constantly threaten calling upon
immigration enforcement. 255
Steven Ratner, a professor of law at the University of Michigan, posits
a model of enterprise liability that is cognizant of the diverse structure of
varied corporations in assessing the appropriately attributable duties.256
Using state responsibility as the analogy, Ratner indicates that corporate
duties are the outgrowth of four other more precise factors: the
"corporation's relationship with the government, its nexus to the affected
population, the particular human right[s] at issue, and the place of
251 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
252 Id. at 636.
2 Colin P. MarksJiminy Cricketfor the Corporation: Understandin2 the Corporate "Conscience," 42 VAL U.
L. REV. 1129,1150-51 (2008).
2 See Fuller, supra note 77, at 1003 (noting that "penalties will not deter illegal immigration if they are
never imposed.").
255 See GoRDON,supra note 117, at 49-50.
256 Steven R Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory ofLegal Responsibility, 111 YALE LJ 443
(2001).
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individuals violating human rights within the corporate structure."257 He
admits that the analogy to state responsibility is not a perfect one,2 58 but
indicates that the labor sphere has come the closest to recognizing this
paradigm as one ripe for international regulation.259 Ratner even cites the
ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries26 as "hinting" at the notion of imposing corporate
duties.261 Thus, in the context of immigration and employment, the
proper enforcement mechanism actually imposed on the business
community would surround employers exercising due diligence over both
its agents and its employees.
The key to both of the proposed changes in this comment; rethinking
the Hoffman standard and devising an internationally enforceable set of
harmonized labor laws that constitute human rights violations, is that they
take the choice out of the hands of employers. Employers are faced with
performing a cost-benefit analysis and come out "on top" by breaking the
law.262 Breaking the corporate detachment to consider the real
exploitation that is taking place requires that the individual corporate
leaders set aside those cost analyses.
The methodology has to be arranged in such a way that employers
and corporations are not forced to choose because given the choice
businesses are not making the rights-based one. "[E]ven when the
societal stakes should be high, corporations can fail to meet legal standards
based on a concern for profits."263 Nevertheless, there can, and should, be
a level of business conduct that is compliant with the basic norms of
society. Milton Friedman has qualified the responsibility of businessmen
to make a profit with the need to do so "while conforming to the basic
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in
ethical custom." 264
2s7 See id. at 496-97.
258 Cf id at 520 (indicating that strict liability does not adequately account for the corporate structure
making the standards of command and control inapplicable to the average business or joint venture).
2 See id. at 509.
260 See generally International Labor Organization, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, I.L.C. No. 169,28 1.LM. 1382.
261 See Ratner, supra note 256, at 509.
2 Daniel T. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade? A orporate Executive's Social Responsibilties With Regard
to Lan, 41 AM. Bus. LJ. 559, 569 (2004).
26 Marks, supra note 253, at 1153.
2 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business, in THE ESSENCE OF FRiEDMAN 37 (Kurt R
Leube ed., Hoover Press Publication 1987).
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Regardless, as a standard, the search for conformity in the business or
consumer society has not encouraged compliance to date. Even corporate
"goodwill" is often tempered by an opportunity to profit. Businesses may
be given a tax deduction, wage a campaign, or receive incentives for some
particular cause.265 So if good corporate behavior is not actually altruistic,
and it is actually more profitable, as in Agriprocessors' case, to hire
undocumented workers, the only viable alternative is to actively pursue
manageable enforcement mechanisms and incentivize best practices.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because current immigration laws often obstruct enforcement of
labor and employment laws, U.S. policies ought to mirror those principles
we demand abroad. Further, we must recognize workplace rights as
synonymous with human rights and change the discourse accordingly.
Government policy and the force of the public behind those policies
could gain the momentum to raise the demands on corporate
responsibility to rival fiscal responsibility inherent in capital-driven
markets and workplaces. As evidenced by the government's motion to
drop the 72 immigration charges against Sholom Rubashkin and the
judge's subsequent grant of that motion, it was duly agreed that failure to
comply with the immigration laws was the lesser of Rubashkin's evils. 66
Current immigration law as it affects employer's gross violations of the
law, simply has no teeth.
Moreover, a manageable solution must take account of an employer's
interest in maintaining a fiscally responsible position in recruiting
employees at a competitive rate, and it must not deprive working
employees of legitimately earned wages. This must also be tempered by
the unique vulnerabilities of migrant workers who are often most
interested in making whatever money they can to send home to their
families. Regardless of these vulnerabilities migrant workers are entitled
to the same fundamental human rights as any other person. Where the
right to a safe workplace and wages to pay that worker are frequently
undersupplied and where the government maintains an inadequate system
to enforce or even discourage these violations, the entire field of law is
undermined. If the worker cannot lawfully be the recipient of the
backpay, it should not preclude the employer from being required to pay.
265 See, e.g., Michael Barbaro, Candles, jeans, Lipsicks: Products With Ultrior Motivs, NY. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2006, at F33.
266 See supra Part IVA for a discussion of the Rubashkin proceedings.
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Paying those wages and other fines into a government-managed account
could strike the proper balance.
Upton Sinclair had it right in the early 1900's, and his characterization
of the meatpacking plant is not far off even today - Agriprocessors actions
and the arguments they set forth in their own defense make this clear.
The corporate climate does not allow for the kind of leeway that is present
in today's immigration and labor laws and thus businesses must be held
accountable for their illegal acts in hiring undocumented workers. The
incentive to break the law, whether by entering the U.S. illegally in search
of employment, or by employing undocumented workers only to pay
them decreased wages for work performed in substandard conditions
must come to an end. New paradigms must be considered and new
power structures imagined in order to compete with the demand for
employment.
